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WHY BREACH OF CONTRACT MAY NOT BE
IMMORAL GIVEN THE INCOMPLETENESS
OF CONTRACTS
Steven Shavell*
There is a widely held view that breach of contract is immoral. 1
suggest here that breach may often be seen as moral, once one ap-
preciates that contracts are incompletely detailed agreements and
that breach may be committed in problematic contingencies that
were not explicitly addressed by the governing contracts. In other
words, it is a mistake generally to treat a breach as a violation of a
promise that was intended to cover the particular contingency that
eventuated.
There is a widely held view that breach of contract is immoral. Yet it is
manifest that legal systems ordinarily do allow breach-the law usually
permits breach if the offending party pays damages 2 - and it is a common-
place that breach occurs. Thus, a tension exists between the felt sense that
wrong has been done when contracts are broken and the actual operation of
the law. This opposition has long been remarked by commentators.3
Recently I wrote on the question of when breach of contract should be
considered immoral.4 My primary point was that breach may often be seen
as moral once one appreciates that contracts are incompletely detailed
* Samuel R. Rosenthal Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School. I thank
Louis Kaplow for comments and the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business for
research support.
1. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, introductory note at 100
(1981); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 17
(1981); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach
of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2009) (an empirical study).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, introductory note at 100 (1981) ("The
traditional goal of the law of contract remedies has not been compulsion of the promisor to perform
his promise but compensation of the promisee for the loss resulting from breach."); see also JOHN
D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 16.1 (4th ed. 1998) ("The primary
relief that the Anglo-American legal systems offer is substitutionary relief, normally damages ....
Specific performance is an extraordinary remedy... ").
3. E.g., O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897) ("The duty
to keep a contract ... means ... that you must pay damages if you do not keep it .... But such a
mode of looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get as
much ethics into the law as they can.").
4. Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439 (2006) [hereinafter
Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?]. Many of the points of that article are first made in Steven
Shavell, Damage measures for breach of contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466, 466-69 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter Shavell, Damage measures], and are amplified in Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS
VERSUS WELFARE 155-223 (2002). See also STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANAL-
YSIS OF LAW 304-12, 338-55, 638-40 (2004).
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agreements and that breach may be committed in problematic contingencies
that were not explicitly addressed by the governing contracts. In other
words, because of contractual incompleteness, it is a mistake generally to
treat a breach as a violation of a promise that was intended to cover the par-
ticular contingency that eventuated.
Seana Shiffrin has critically examined my analysis of the immorality of
breach in her symposium contribution.! I here want to respond to her-
mainly to disagree, but partly to agree. I will first review my prior argument
and then will comment on Shiffrin.
I. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT THAT BREACH MAY NOT BE
IMMORAL GIVEN THE INCOMPLETENESS OF CONTRACTS6
A. Definition of Moral Behavior in a Contingency7
To discuss the immorality of breach, one must, of course, state what
constitutes moral behavior in the contractual context. I make two simple
definitional assumptions. First, I presume that if a contract provides explic-
itly for a contingency, then the moral duty to perform in that contingency is
governed by the contract. Second, I suppose that if a contract is incomplete
in the sense that it does not provide explicitly for a contingency, then the
moral duty to perform in the contingency is governed by what a completely
detailed contract addressing the contingency would have stipulated, assum-
ing that the parties know what this hypothetical contract would have stated. 8
Consider, for example, a contract concerning the clearing of snow from
a person's driveway and the contingency that the seller's snow clearing
equipment is stolen.9 Suppose that the contract specifies that if such a theft
occurs, the seller still has an obligation to clear snow (perhaps because he
can readily rent snow clearing equipment). Then the seller is assumed to
have a moral duty to clear snow even if his equipment is stolen. However, if
the contract mentions the possibility of theft and says that in that event the
seller does not have to clear snow (perhaps because it would be very diffi-
cult to rent substitute equipment on the spot), then the seller would not have
a moral duty to perform should his equipment be stolen. And, if the contract
5. Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral?, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1551 (2009)
[hereinafter Shiffrin, Breach of Contract]; see also Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of
Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007).
6. I here sketch the argument of Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, supra note 4.
7. This section is reprinted with permission of the Emory Law Journal, and appeared in part
in Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, supra note 4.
8. In reality, what a contract would have said about a particular contingency might not be
known with confidence by the parties, implying that they might not know their moral duties with
confidence.
9. In this example, taken from Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, supra note 4, at
443, and below, I will refer to the party who would provide performance as the seller (rather than
the promisor) and to the party who would receive performance as the buyer (rather than the pro-
misee).
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does not mention the contingency of theft explicitly, the seller's obligation
to clear snow in that circumstance would be determined by what a hypo-
thetical complete contract would have said, assuming that the parties know
its nature.
The appeal of the foregoing definition of moral obligation derives from
the observation that a contract that provides explicitly for a contingency is
similar to a promise that provides explicitly for a contingency, and that there
are well known grounds for finding that individuals have moral obligations
to keep such promises. 0 I will return to the subject of the appeal of my defi-
nition of moral obligation in the contractual domain in Part II. For the
remainder of this Part, I put that matter to the side and develop the implica-
tions of my definition.
B. The Observed Incompleteness of Contracts
That the definition of moral obligation applies when contracts do not
explicitly mention the contingency that arose is important because this may
well be the state of affairs. We see that in reality contracts are far from com-
pletely detailed. Although a contract for removing snow from a person's
driveway might mention a number of conditions, for instance whether clear-
ing is to be done on Christmas day, it will typically omit a practically
endless number of events that could matter to the seller-theft of his snow-
clearing equipment, illness of his crew, snow so deep that it makes roads
impassable-or to the buyer-unexpected travel out of town over the winter,
sale of her home, inheritance of snow clearing equipment.
It is true that contracts will often provide implicitly for many, and per-
haps all, contingencies. "Suppose that a contract states that 'snow is to be
cleared from the buyer's driveway if the snow is over five inches deep,' and
that the contract mentions no other conditions."' This contract implicitly
covers the contingency of theft because "in a formal sense the contract cov-
ers all contingencies: it divides them into two general categories, those in
which the snow is up to five inches deep (whatever else happens), and those
in which the snow is over five inches deep (whatever else happens)." But
because the contract does not mention theft explicitly, I consider the con-
tract to be incomplete as to that contingency.
Why are contracts substantially incomplete in that they omit explicit
mention of numerous contingencies? Most obviously, it is because time is
needed to discuss and to include contingent provisions in contracts. If a con-
tingency like theft of snow clearing equipment is sufficiently unlikely, the
probability-discounted benefit of providing for it in the contract will be low
10. See, e.g., DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE § 3.2.5 (David Fate Norton &
Mary J. Norton eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (1739); IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 15, 32, 38 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997)
(1785); W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 16-47 (Philip Stratton-Lake ed., 2002) (1930); John
Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955).
11. This example is taken from Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, supra note 4, at
446-47.
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and will be outweighed by the cost of the time that would be spent to do so.
Other significant reasons for contractual incompleteness are that a contin-
gency (such as whether a person had a stomachache) might be hard for a
court to verify, which would make a clause depending on its occurrence un-
workable; that parties might be able to renegotiate if a problematic
circumstance arises; and that parties might be able to commit breach and
pay damages if a difficulty arises. In all, then, the existence of significant
contractual incompleteness is not surprising.
C. The Morality of Breach When Contracts Are Incomplete
Given the importance of incompleteness of contracts, we know that
questions about the morality of breach will often concern situations in
which the contingency that occurred was not specifically mentioned in the
contract. If a snow clearing company breaches its contract to clear my dri-
veway when its equipment was stolen but the contract did not explicitly
address that contingency, we cannot assess the morality of the breach by
pretending that the contract did address the contingency (in which case the
breach would be immoral by hypothesis). We must engage in further in-
quiry. To determine whether the breach was moral under my definition, we
have to ascertain "whether performance would ... have been required had
the contingency been expressly addressed" in the contract, that is, we need
to understand the character of hypothetical complete contracts. '
D. The Nature of Obligations to Perform in Hypothetical
Completely Detailed Contracts
We can deduce a very important characteristic about the nature of a hy-
pothetical complete contract agreed upon by rational parties. Namely,
performance will be required in a "contingency if and only if the cost [of
performance to the seller]... would be less than the value of performance
to the buyer."3
The logic leading to this conclusion is that if the contract were other-
wise, it could always be altered in a way that both parties would prefer-
hence they would never settle on a contract unless it were of the claimed
type. To illustrate, suppose in our snow clearing example that the buyer and
the seller consider a contract that calls for performance in a contingency in
which the cost of performance to the seller would be $300 and would ex-
ceed the value to the buyer of $100. Thus the contemplated contract is
different from the claimed type. Let the contemplated contract be changed
only in the term covering this contingency: under the adjusted contract, the
snow does not have to be cleared, and the seller must make a payment to the
buyer of $110 (in addition to whatever other payment might have been
stipulated in the contemplated contract). Clearly, the buyer would be better
12. Id. at 448.
13. Id. at 444-45.
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off in the contingency at issue under the new contract, for she would re-
ceive, in the $110 payment, more than the $100 value she would lose from
not having snow removed. Likewise, the seller would be better off in the
contingency because his payment of $110 would be less than his cost sav-
ings of $300 from not having to perform. Because both parties would be
better off in the contingency in question and would be just as well off in all
other contingencies (because the new contract does not change in those con-
tingencies), both parties would prefer the new contract to the contemplated
one. Hence, they would never agree to the contemplated contract calling for
performance when the cost would exceed the value of performance. Similar
logic shows that the parties would never agree to a contract in which there is
a contingency not calling for performance even though its cost would be less
than its value.'
4
The conclusion just discussed validates what should be appealing to the
intuition in a qualitative sense. One would expect that if the parties were
bargaining over each contingency individually, they would agree on per-
formance when it would not be very expensive for the seller relative to its
value to the buyer but agree that it is not worthwhile to specify performance
when its cost for the seller would be high.
E. The Immorality or Morality of Breach When Contracts Are Incomplete
Can Be Inferred from the Willingness of the Party in Breach
to Pay Damages
5
If there is a breach in a contingency that was not provided for, such as
theft of snow clearing equipment, how can we ascertain whether, had they
discussed that contingency explicitly, the parties would have agreed that
there would or would not be an obligation to perform?
We know from Section I.D that the answer inheres in whether the cost of
performance was less than its value. If that is so, then the parties would have
specified performance and the breach would thus be immoral; if that is not
so, and the cost would have exceeded the value of performance, the breach
would not be immoral. Must we make a direct inquiry about the cost and the
value of performance to know whether the breach was immoral? The answer
is no.
We can draw an inference about the cost of performance if the breaching
party paid damages for breach. We know that the party in breach must have
considered the cost of performance to be greater than the damage amount.
In particular, suppose that the measure of damages is the expectation, that is,
the value of performance to the buyer. Then a seller will commit breach if
14. Although this paragraph demonstrates that the conditions under which performance is
specified must be as claimed, it does not show what the contract price or possible payments made in
the event of nonperformance would be. These elements of the contract would depend on characteris-
tics of the parties and cannot be predicted on a priori grounds.
15. This section is reprinted with permission of the Emory Law Journal, and appeared in part
in Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, supra note 4.
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and only if his cost of performance would exceed the value of performance.
In the snow clearing contract, suppose that the value of performance to the
buyer is $200. Then if the seller breaches after his equipment is stolen and
pays expectation damages, we infer that his cost of performance exceeded
$200. 16 Because the cost exceeds the value, this implies that had the parties
discussed the theft contingency, they would have agreed that there would be
no duty to perform in that event. Thus, the seller's breach and failure to
clear snow when his equipment is stolen is not immoral; his behavior is pre-
cisely in accord with what would have been the terms of a completely
detailed contract that spoke to the circumstance-the theft of snow clearing
equipment-that actually occurred.
This example illustrates the general point that when the measure of
damages equals the expectation, a seller will be led to breach if and only if
the cost of performance exceeds the value of performance to the buyer. Be-
cause that is exactly when a seller would not have to perform in a
completely detailed contract, the seller will fail to perform in the same con-
tingencies as the seller would be permitted not to perform in a hypothetical
complete contract. Accordingly, breach should not be characterized as im-
moral when expectation damages are paid for breach.
7
Now assume that damages for breach are less than the expectation. Be-
cause breach will tend to occur whenever the cost of performance exceeds
the level of damages, breach will occur more often than nonperformance
would have been permitted in a completely specified contract-thus breach
might be immoral. In our example, if the measure of damages were, say, $50
instead of the expectation of $200, breach would occur whenever the cost of
performance would exceed $50. Consequently, if breach occurred when the
cost would be between $50 and $200, the complete contract would have
insisted on performance. Such breach would be immoral."
F. When Is Breach Immoral and When Is it Moral in Practice ?"
Given the conclusions just reached, we can say that if damages equal the
buyer's expectation, breach can be inferred to be moral because it will occur
only when the parties would have allowed nonperformance in a complete
contract. However, when damages are less than the expectation, we cannot
16. To amplify, suppose that the contract price is paid in advance. Then expectation damages
would equal $200, for that amount must be received by the buyer to make her whole. Consequently,
the seller would not commit breach unless the cost exceeded $200. Alternatively, suppose that the
contract price, say $125, is to be paid upon performance. Then expectation damages would equal
$75, for now it is this amount that must be received to make the buyer whole. Hence, if the seller
commits breach, he forgoes collecting the $125 and pays $75, and so suffers a total cost of $200;
again, therefore, he would not commit breach unless the cost exceeded $200.
17. Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, supra note 4, at 449.
18. Id. at 450.
19. This section is reprinted with permission of the Emory Law Journal, and appeared in part
in Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, supra note 4.
1574 [Vol. 107:1569
Why Breach of Contract May Not Be Immoral
make this inference and would have to inquire directly about the cost of per-
formance relative to its value in order to make a judgment about its morality.
Are damages fully compensatory? They are intended to be. The expecta-
tion measure is, of course, the general damage remedy employed for breach
of contract, where the expectation measure is defined as the amount that
would restore the victim of a breach to the position that this party would
have enjoyed had there been performance.0 The expectation measure as it is
actually applied, however, tends to be less than fully compensatory and may
leave the victim of a breach substantially worse off than he or she would
have been had there been performance. 2' The reasons given for believing
that the expectation measure is often undercompensatory include the follow-
ing. First, courts are reluctant to credit hard-to-measure components of loss
as damages. Hence, lost profits and idiosyncratic losses due to breach are
likely to be inadequately compensated or neglected. Second, courts are in-
clined to limit damages to those that could have been reasonably foreseen at
the time the contract was made. Third, damages tend not to reflect the con-
siderable delays that victims of breach may suffer. Fourth, legal costs are not
compensated.
Not only do expectation damages appear to be undercompensatory in a
general sense, but damages for breach may be effectively nonexistent if the
breach victim's losses are less than the costs of bringing suit, which is to
say, are below a threshold of several thousand dollars. If the losses are not
this high, the breach victim will not have a credible threat to litigate."
In view of these remarks about the adequacy of damages, the practical
reality is that breach will often be of suspect moral quality, and the likeli-
hood that breach is immoral will be higher the lower are damages in relation
to the true expectation.
II. CRITICISM AND DISCUSSION OF THE FOREGOING ARGUMENT
Seana Shiffrin makes three criticisms of the argument that I have sum-
marized. The first is that she disputes my conclusion that the hypothetical
complete contract would be as I asserted--calling for performance when
and only when its cost is less than its value. The second criticism is that she
does not find that the hypothetical complete contract provides an appealing
moral standard for the obligation to perform. The third criticism is that she
believes that performance per se should possess a positive moral valence,
whereas performance does not have this character in my framework. After
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 346-47 (1981); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra
note 2, § 14.4.
21. A good account of why damages are undercompensatory is given in Melvin A. Eisen-
berg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference
Principle in Contract Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 975, 989-96 (2005).
22. If, for example, a lawyer's hourly fee is $250, and only twenty hours of his or her time
are required to litigate, the legal costs of litigation would be $5000, implying that the expected gain
from suit would have to exceed this amount for a threat to litigate to be credible.
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discussing these criticisms, I consider the issue of how to choose among
different definitions of moral behavior in the contractual context.
A. The Nature of the Hypothetical Complete Contract
Shiffrin appears to have misunderstood an assumption that I made con-
cerning the hypothetical complete contract. I presumed that each contingent
provision in a hypothetical complete contract calling for performance would
definitely be enforced-so that such a contract means exactly what it says.
For simplicity, I also presumed that if a contingent provision does not call
for performance, no payment would be made by the seller if that contin-23
gency arose. In contrast, Shiffrin seems to have thought that under the
hypothetical complete contract, breach was permitted if a person paid dam-
24
ages.
In any event, and more importantly, Shiffrin questions the central claim
that the agreed terms of the hypothetical contract would specify perform-
ance in a contingency if and only if its cost to the seller is less than its value
to the buyer. In fact, the claim is correct-it is an objective claim that fol-
lows from straightforward logic and is a standard point in the economic
literature on contracts. 2' The example I provided of the argument for the
claim in Section I.D is essentially a general proof. It shows that if any term
in a proposed contract does not have the asserted character, an altered con-
tract with that term changed in the claimed way can be devised such that
both the buyer and the seller prefer the new contract. Indeed, this argument
explains why a surmise of Shiffrin is incorrect. She suggests that the claim
might not hold if one were to take into account bargaining over all the terms
of the contract.2' But the argument does not depend on the other terms in the
contract. The argument shows that by adjusting only the term applying in a
single contingency, both parties will be made better off regardless of what
the other terms might have been.
23. I considered hypothetical completely detailed contracts in Shavell, Is Breach of Contract
Immoral?, supra note 4, at 444-46. The discussion and calculations there are premised on the as-
sumption that performance occurs when a contract states that it is to occur. Breach and payment of
damages are never mentioned and play no role in the hypothetical complete contract.
24. Shiffrin, Breach of Contract, supra note 5, at 1557-59, speculates on what the hypotheti-
cal complete contract means. She conjectures that the parties would have elected terms that
"provided the promisor with a disjunctive option to perform or pay expectation damages. I suspect
that ... this is the correct interpretation of [Shavell's] position." Id. at 1558-59. As I just stated in
the text and in the preceding note, that was not my assumption. Also, I observe that had I made a
different definition of the hypothetical contract, under which nonperformance would be accompa-
nied by the payment of money by the seller, my conclusion about the agreed upon conditions of
performance would be the same. Indeed, the argument given in Section I.D demonstrates this.
25. See, e.g., Benjamin E. Hermalin et al., Contract Law, in I HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
EcONOMicS 3, 24-25 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007); Shavell, Damage meas-
ures, supra note 4, at 475-76.
26. Shiffrin, Breach of Contract, supra note 5, at 1559 ("Shavell fails to contemplate the entire
contract and its contents. He focuses on how the contingency would have been settled in isolation.").
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B. Does the Hypothetical Complete Contract Provide an
Appealing Moral Standard?
Shiffrin questions the appeal of my definition of the moral obligation to
perform. She asks, "[i]s he right to assert that there is a moral duty to per-
form only if the parties would have explicitly agreed to perform had they
squarely faced the contingency that is the occasion for the breach?
27
However, she does not address head on the attraction of my definition of
moral obligation. That is, if the parties to the contract know what they would
have provided for in an express provision for the contingency that actually
occurred-and they did not make the express provision only because of
some practical reason-one would think their moral duty would be gov-
erned by the agreement that they would have made but for this practical
reason. Suppose that the buyer and the snow clearer signed a contract read-
ing simply that "snow clearer shall clear buyer's snow from her driveway";
that they both understand that had their contract mentioned theft of equip-
ment, the clearer would not have to remove snow; and that they did not
include a provision mentioning theft because they did not feel it was worth
the trouble given the unlikelihood of theft. Realizing all of this, why would
the buyer feel that the clearer has a moral obligation to remove snow if his
equipment had been stolen, and why would the clearer feel such an obliga-
tion? It is not apparent to me that either the buyer or the seller would feel
that the seller had an obligation to perform. An obligation could only be felt,
I think, if the parties mistakenly conflate the incomplete contract reading
"snow clearer shall clear buyer's snow from her driveway" with an explicit
agreement intended to cover theft of snow clearing equipment.
Instead, among other things, Shiffrin emphasizes an issue that I did not
discuss and imputes to me a view about it that I do not hold. She considers
the possibility that one party to a contract might have superior information
28to the other. If this is so, she intimates that the party with superior knowl-
edge could enjoy an unfair advantage if his moral obligation is determined
by the hypothetical complete contract. For instance, if the snow clearer
knows his equipment is likely to be stolen and the buyer does not, the buyer
might be led to pay too much for the contract. I did not address such issues
of asymmetry of information because they are collateral to the main point of
interest for us.29 Had I considered asymmetry of information, I would have
27. Id. at 1560.
28. Shiffrin states her position as follows:
[O]ne may be tempted by the thought that ... one party should bear the burden for not raising
the contingency and ushering the parties to a concrete explicit bargain. In the case of the con-
tract for snow removal, for example, the risks and costs of equipment failure are more salient
to the promisor than to the promisee .... One might presume ... that he bears default respon-
sibility for performance in this contingency; or at the very least ... for drawing attention to the
issue.
Id. at 1560-61.
29. To understand the morality of breach, it is clarifying to focus on a contractual context
uncluttered by, not only issues of unequal information, but a whole host of others (duress, mitiga-
June 20091
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analyzed the moral obligation to disclose information at the time of con-
tracting, as well as to perform,0 and my conclusions about the moral
obligation to perform in the absence of disclosure would be different.
Shiffrin also suggests that one of the main implications of my view-
that committing breach and paying expectation damages is morally permis-
sible-violates her moral intuition. She finds it counterintuitive, offensive to
her sense of right and wrong, that a party can breach and pay such damages.
"So long as A would rather just pay expectation damages than perform, does
that mean A does no moral wrong if she decides not to perform?"'" My reac-
tion to this view is twofold. First, as I explained in Section I.E, that breach
induced by payment of expectation damages is moral is a logical conclusion
following from my definition of morality of performance. But second, my
definition of morality of performance may certainly be questioned. Al-
though I commented above on why it might have appeal, other definitions of
morality need to be considered. Let me now turn to the concept of morality
in contractual behavior endorsed by Shiffrin.
C. The Idea that Performance Per Se Has Moral Importance
Shiffrin finds attractive notions of morality under which there is a spe-
cial obligation to perform an act stated in the contract, even though she does
not offer a precise definition or account of this opinion about moral behav-
ior. She says, "[t]he idea that performance matters is a difficult point to
support directly. It is the sort of position toward which one tends to be
drawn by instinct rather than led by explicit direction."32
In her ensuing discussion, one point that she stresses is that the purpose
of a contract is to obtain performance, so that allowing breach and payment
of expectation damages would "invert" the true warrant for a contract." An-
other point that she advances is that the victim of breach loses his
freedom-becoming an involuntary employee of the party in breach-
because the victim has to find a replacement manner of obtaining perform-
34
ance.
I am sympathetic to Shiffrin's views in the sense that I believe that most
readers share her intuition that it is wrong to breach a contract, as I discuss
in the following Section.
tion, and so on). Any of these issues could, in general, lead to different conclusions about the moral
duty to perform.
30. If the moral obligation to disclose information mirrors the functional obligation to per-
form, there would often, but not always, be a moral duty to reveal information at the time of
contracting. For a discussion on economic analysis of contractual disclosure obligations, see An-
thony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1978), and Steven Shavell, Acquisition and disclosure of infornation prior to sale, 25 RAND J.
EcON. 20 (1994).
31. Shiffrin, Breach of Contract, supra note 5, at 1562.
32. Id. at 1564.
33. Id. at 1565-66.
34. Id. at 1566.
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D. The Choice Among Definitions of Moral Behavior in the
Contractual Context
The debate between Shiffrin and me about the morality of breach of
contract can be ascribed primarily to our different definitions of moral be-
havior. This leads to the question, how might a person choose among
competing definitions of such behavior? Let me comment on three criteria
by which a definition might be chosen.35
First, a definition might be endorsed because it reflects the moral beliefs
that individuals actually hold about the moral propriety of breach. My ex-
perience, and I suspect the reader's, has been that most individuals react to
breach in the way Shiffrin supposes they do, as having an ethically incorrect
aspect. Indeed, I conducted a limited survey confirming this hypothesis,36
and a recent study by psychologists validates it as well.37
Why would individuals tend to hold the view that breach is wrong? The
core of the explanation, I believe, is that contractual agreements are seen by
individuals as close to, or as even indistinguishable from, promises made in
every day life. Such promises are statements that most people think they
have a moral obligation to honor. We are taught from childhood that our
promises ought to be kept, and this view is reinforced throughout our lives.
Thus, it is natural for us to identify contracts with the promises that we have
learned to treat as having moral valence. We do not pause to consider that
contracts are in fact different from promises made in social intercourse, and
that breaking contracts, unlike breaking promises, results in the payment of
damages.
Second, a definition of the morality of breach might be selected because
it has been developed from certain underlying principles with which one
agrees. The definition that I have advanced is partly of this nature, as it is
premised on the theory that contracts should be viewed through the lens of
hypothetical complete contracts, to which there would be a moral obligation
to adhere. I am not sure how to categorize Shiffrin's views, although my
conjecture is that they are based on some combination of the first, empirical
criterion, and of the second, underlying principles criterion.
Third, a definition of the morality of breach might be chosen because it
promotes the welfare of contracting parties." According to this criterion, my
definition of the moral desirability of breach is attractive, for if the defini-
tion governs performance-if performance occurs when and only when its
35. These criteria may overlap and are not exhaustive.
36. Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, supra note 4, at 452-55. In particular, I found
that "the individuals participating in the survey found the simple, unqualified fact of breach to be
unethical on average." Id. at 455. However, when individuals were prompted by being asked to
consider the terms of hypothetical complete contracts, they changed their opinions somewhat. Id.
37. Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 1.
38. By the welfare of a party, I refer to the party's expected utility. In strict logic, the utility
of a party could depend not only on conventional components of well-being (material goods and
services, friendship, and the like) but also on satisfaction of moral notions, but I overlook this latter
point for present purposes.
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cost is less than its value-parties will tend to be better off than under any
other standard for performance. As the reader knows, if under a proposed
contract parties do not perform exactly when cost is less than value, it is
always possible to find an alternative contract that both parties would prefer.
Relatedly, a regime of breach and payment of expectation damages pro-
motes the welfare of the contracting parties relative to a regime of required
performance. One way of demonstrating this point is to observe that if there
is a breach and payment of expectation damages, the buyer is not harmed-
by hypothesis expectation damages are the equivalent of receiving perform-
ance-and the seller is benefited-the seller, after all, chose to commit
breach so must have been made better off thereby. In other words, from an
ex post perspective, the ability of sellers to commit breach and pay expecta-
tion damages benefits them but does not harm buyers. And from an ex ante
perspective, the ability of sellers to commit breach and pay damages tends
to help buyers affirmatively (rather than merely not to harm them), for sell-
ers can afford to give buyers a price reduction on account of the anticipated
benefit derived from their ability to commit breach.
In contrast, Shiffrin seems to believe that a regime permitting breach and
payment of expectation damages lowers the welfare of buyers and discour-
ages the making of contracts. She avers that if expectation damages were
always paid, "[n]o promisee would ever get what she sought. As a further
consequence, if this were the universalized response, then agreements would
then never be made. The same is not true if performance were the universal-
ized response to a promise to perform. '39 This is a perplexing view. As I
stated in the preceding paragraph, the buyer is made whole if she receives
expectation damages, so she should not be discouraged from contracting
under a regime with breach and payment of these damages. Moreover, the
seller becomes better off if he can breach and pay damages, so he should be
positively encouraged to contract and could share his benefit with the buyer
by lowering the contract price. This well-known point from the theory of
contracts 4° helps to explain why contracts flourish under our contract law
that permits breach and payment of damages, and also why contracting
would be unduly hindered were performance insisted upon as a matter of
course.
CONCLUSION
I have explained in this essay why I think that Seana Shiffrin's criticisms
of the pure logic of my article are misplaced. Contracts are, I observed, sub-
stantially incomplete, so that a breach of a contract is ordinarily not a
violation of an agreement that explicitly mentioned the contingency that
occurred. And if one accepts my definition of moral behavior as that which
would have been agreed upon in a hypothetical complete contract, it follows
that breach and payment of expectation damages is not immoral, because
39. Shiffrin, Breach of Contract, supra note 5, at 1565.
40. See Shavell, Damage measures, supra note 4, at 478.
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such breaches occur only when performance would not have been specified
in a complete contract.
I also asked about the appeal to the moral intuition of my definition of
moral contractual behavior. Although I believe that my definition has attrac-
tiveness, because it reflects the notion that intended promises should be kept
but not unintended ones, I also believe that its virtues can only be appreci-
ated upon reflection. Most individuals seem instinctively to hold a different
view, of which Shiffrin's is an exemplar, namely, that breach per se has an
immoral dimension. I suggested that the primary explanation for why indi-
viduals hold this moral belief is that they regard contracts as simple
promises and ignore the incompleteness of contracts-individuals tend to
confuse the violation of a contract with the breaking of an explicit promise.
Last, I observed that different criteria may be employed for choosing
among definitions of morality: consistency with the moral beliefs found in
the population; derivation from favored underlying principles; and the ad-
vancement of the welfare of contracting parties. I stressed that according to
the welfare criterion, my definition of when breach ought to occur is desir-
able and that breach and payment of expectation damages raises the well-
being of both sellers and buyers. Conversely, a moral view under which
positive weight is accorded to performance per se works against the interests
of both sellers and buyers.
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